Although largely predictable, this conference had huge ramifications for the future of Chinese and world politics. Every five years, China’s Communist Party calls a Congress, in which its membership and agenda for the next five years is announced. Conventionally, China’s President ends their leadership after ten years, spanning a maximum of two terms; however, in 2018 Xi’s CCP abolished this limit on the presidency. This year, with sessions on the 16th and 22nd October, Xi Jinping consolidated his power in a third term as both leader of the CCP (General Secretary) and military commander-in-chief (Chairman of the Central Military Commission). Xi also holds the Presidency, making him head of state, and is due to renew this in the National People’s Congress next spring.
Firstly, let’s summarise the big problems facing the CCP right now: Chinese people are tired of stringent “Zero Covid” measures; one in five young Chinese people are currently unemployed; the US is implementing policies to seriously limit China’s access to high technologies; and there is a housing crisis looming. Yet Xi didn’t address any of this. Instead, he called for a national struggle against hostile foreign forces, and further increases to party control in the name of national security.
So what did Xi focus on? The president fervently defended the continued crack-down on Covid, as an “all-out people’s war”, stating that when it comes to the virus, “perseverance is victory”.
He also explicitly mentioned higher taxes coming for the rich in the Political Work Report, in line with the CCP’s ‘Common Prosperity’ policy, which aims to even out inequality in China.
Interestingly, Xi’s language about Taiwan didn’t modulate to a more aggressive or urgent tone, as Taiwan and its allies had feared it might, but the Chinese president’s enduring focus on an inevitable “reunified motherland” remains concerning for peace there.
The congress also marked the retirement of Li and Wang Yang, who had been members of the small and powerful Politburo Standing Committee, thus giving Xi space to appoint an overwhelmingly loyalist Politburo for the next term. For example, Shanghai Party Secretary Li Qiang, who disastrously locked down the province for over two months at the start of this year,and is hugely unpopular with the public, has been promoted by Xi due to his loyalty to the Standing Committee’s second position, and is now poised to become prime minister. Bill Bishop suggests that for Xi, “loyalty is merit”, with dedication to the party trumping competency when appointing the top jobs.
Disappointingly, there were no women appointed to the new Politburo, breaking with the convention of the past 20 years, and highlighting the CCP’s reluctance to break from a patriarchal structure of governance. Moreover, no women have ever been appointed to the powerful inner circle Standing Committee, which perhaps underscores Xi’s willingness to surround himself with an echo chamber of loyalist men.
Additionally, one notable and unforeseen moment was when former Chinese leader Hu Jintao, 79, was escorted out of the congress, which is unusual in such an event; David Rennie compares it to a former senior member of the royal family being escorted out of the coronation just before it begins. Whilst the official narrative is that the former leader was experiencing health issues so had to depart, in such a heavily scripted event with the eyes of the world on China, some cannot help thinking Xi was trying to send a message: rivals will not be tolerated, and he is the only one running the show now.
Despite being an incredibly staged affair, this Communist Party Conference was far from uneventful, and another pivotal moment in the increasingly concerning consolidation of Xi Jin Ping as the party’s leader, probably for life.
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